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In this essay, Akhil and Vikram Amar attack the constitutionality of the
current presidential succession statute, which places the Speaker of the House
and the Senate President pro tempore first and second in line, respectively, if
there is neither a President nor a Vice President. Relying on the words of the
Framers, the text and logic of the Constitution, and various practical and ethi-
cal concerns, the Amars conclude that federal legislators are not "Officers"
under the Succession Clause and thus ineligible for the line of succession. Fi-
nally, the Amars suggest that an updated succession statute should provide for
a prompt national election after succession, and should iron out various other
wrinkles in the current succession statute.
PRESIDENT GINGRICH?'
Since the November 1994 election, Speaker Newt Gingrich has sparked
controversy with remarks on a broad range of political and social issues. But
one thing that he has said over and over-that he, as Speaker of the House of
Representatives, is second in the succession line for the Presidency-has been
accepted matter-of-factly by admirer and detractor alike. On the surface, Ging-
rich's claim that he is two heartbeats away from the Oval Office is completely
consistent with current law. The federal succession statute clearly assigns the
powers and duties of the Presidency to the Speaker of the House "[i]f, by rea-
son of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify,
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A., Yale University, 1980; J.D., Yale Law
School, 1984.
** Acting Professor of Law, University of California at Davis; Visiting Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley. A.B., University of California at Berkeley, 1985; J.D., Yale Law
School, 1988.
We dedicate this essay to Professor Charles L. Black, Jr., whose pioneering work on structure and
relationship in constitutional law has inspired the way we think about the Constitution, here and
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1. Cf Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REv. 913 (1992) (discussing
the possibility of former Vice President Dan Quayle succeeding to the Presidency and advocating
consideration of executive ticket splitting to allow Vice Presidents to be independently elected).
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there is neither a President nor Vice President."'2 But serious questions lurk at a
deeper level-questions about the constitutionality of the succession statute it-
self. In this essay, we conclude that the best reading of the Constitution's text,
history, and structure excludes federal legislators from the line of presidential
succession. Our most important reasoning is structural: If legislators are in
line to fill a vacant Oval Office, a pervasive conflict of interest will warp their
judicial roles in presidential and vice-presidential impeachment proceedings;
and similar pressures will tempt lawmakers to betray our Constitution's careful
rejection of a Parliamentary/Prime Minister Model of presidential selection.
I. THE CONSTITUTION
The core issue is whether the current federal succession statute, 3 U.S.C.
section 19, is a valid exercise of congressional power under the Constitution's
Succession Clause, which states:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resigna-
tion, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the
Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law pro-
vide for the Case ofRemoval, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the Pres-
ident and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President,
and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected.3
More specifically, the question is whether the Speaker (or the Senate President
pro tempore, since he is next on the section 19 list) is an "Officer" within the
meaning of the Succession Clause, such that Congress "may by Law ...
declar[e]" that he shall "act as President."
A. Text and Original Understanding
To answer this question, we begin of course with the constitutional text
itself. The Constitution employs the concepts of offices and officers in many
different provisions. At various points the document refers to "Officers of the
United States, ' 4 to "civil Officers of the United States,"' 5 to "civil Office under
the Authority of the United States, ' 6 to "Office under the United States," 7 and
to "Office of Trust or Profit under the United States."'8 As a textual matter,
each of these five formulations seemingly describes the same stations (apart
2. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (1994). Section 19 goes on to provide that if the Speaker is unable to serve,
the President pro tempore of the Senate shall act as President. Id. § 19(b). (The current President pro
tempore-three heartbeats away from the Oval Office-is the nonagenarian South Carolina Senator
Strom Thurmond.) The statute also ranks various Cabinet members (beginning with the Secretary of
State) who would succeed if neither the Speaker nor the President pro tempore were able to serve. Id.
§ 19(d)(1).
3. U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (emphasis added).
4. E.g., id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause); id. art. II, § 3 (Commission Clause).
5. E.g., id. art. II, § 4 (Impeachment Clause).
6. E.g., id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (Emoluments Clause).
7. E.g., id. (Incompatibility Clause).
8. E.g., id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (Electoral College Clause); see also id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 ("Office of
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States") (Impeachment Sanctions Clause); id. art. VI, cl. 3
("Office or public Trust under the United States") (No Religious Test Clause).
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from the civil/military distinction)-the modifying terms "of," "under," and
"under the Authority of" are essentially synonymous. And if the term "Of-
ficer" in the Succession Clause is merely shorthand for any of these five longer
formulations, then federal legislators are constitutionally ineligible for succes-
sion: The Incompatibility Clause of Article I, Section 6 makes clear that sitting
members of Congress cannot hold "any Office under the United States."9 "Of-
ficers" of or under the United States thus means certain members of the execu-
tive and judicial branches, but not legislators-the legacy of an earlier view
sharply distinguishing the "people's" representatives in Parliament from
"crown" officers in executive and judicial positions. The Article II Commis-
sion Clause confirms this reading: "[A]ll the [executive and judicial] Officers
of the United States" receive a commission from the President,' 0 but federal
legislators have never needed nor received such commissions to serve in the
House or Senate."
Further support for this officer/legislator distinction comes from the Im-
peachment Clause, which makes "all civil Officers of the United States" sub-
ject to removal. 12 In the William Blount impeachment case in 1798, the Senate
correctly rejected the idea that its members were "civil Officers" within the
meaning of the Constitution, and thus subject to impeachment. 13 As future
Supreme Court Justice James Iredell had put the point in constitutional ratifica-
tion debates a decade earlier: "[W]ho ever heard of impeaching a member of
the legislature?"'14 Thus, federal legislators are neither "Officers under the
9. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (emphasis added). The full text reads: "[No Person holding any Office
under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." For
extensive analysis of this clause and its importance as a repudiation of a parliamentary system of gov-
ernment, see generally Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of
Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CoRNELL L. RaE. 1045 (1994).
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
11. See id. art. I, § 5, cl. I (vesting power in "Each House," and not in the President, to determine
legislative qualifications and to judge elections). Although the Speaker and the President pro tempore
may be considered "officers" of the legislature, see notes 21-22 infra and accompanying text, they too
have never received presidential commissions as "Officers of the United States."
12. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 4.
13. See GoPDoN S. WooD, THE CREATioN OF m AiaucAN Ra, tauc 1776-1787, at 523 n.7
(1969); Ruth C. Silva, The Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 47 MicH. L. Rav. 451, 461 (1949).
14. 4 THE DEBATES IN TmE SEvERAL STATE CoNvENTioNs ON THE ADOPTION oF THE FEDERAL
CONsrTrUIoN, As REcosmMNDED By THE GENERAL CoNVEMoN AT PHILADELPHIA iN 1787, at 127
(Jonathan Elliot ed.) (2d ed. Washington 1836). To remove unfit legislators from government, the Con-
stitution provides a specially tailored alternative to impeachment: expulsion by a two-thirds vote of
one's own House. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. Expulsion gives each House exclusive control over its
own membership; impeachment of legislators, by contrast, would embroil each House in the other's
controversies.
This reading of Article II's Impeachment Clause also has implications for the Impeachment Sanc-
tions Clause of Article I, Section 3, which declares that conviction in an impeachment case can disqual-
ify a person from "any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States." Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. By
parity of logic with the Impeachment Clause as expounded in the Blount affair, a convicted executive or
judicial "Officer" could be barred from executive or judicial "Office," but remain eligible for a congres-
sional seat since, by definition, it is a nonOfficer position. Cf Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 520
n.41 (1969) (noting but not reaching this issue).
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United States," nor (to the extent that there is any difference) "Officers of the
United States.' '15
There is considerable historical evidence that the Constitution's drafters
used the term "Officer" in the Succession Clause as shorthand for "Officer of
the United States." In fact, early versions of the clause approved by the Phila-
delphia Convention explicitly employed the longer formulation.' 6 According
to James Madison's notes, the Convention understood that only" 'officers' of
the U.S." (the italics are Madison's) would be eligible. 17 A later style commit-
tee deleted the words "of the United States," but no evidence suggests that this
style change was meant to change meaning is In discussing Congress' first
attempt to implement the Succession Clause, the Presidential Succession Act of
1792,19 Madison suggested that legislators were not "officers, in the constitu-
tional sense" (again the italics are his) and that Congress "certainly err[ed]" in
allowing legislators to succeed to the Presidency.20
This textual argument against legislative succession, while forceful, is not
quite a slam dunk. In two places, the Constitution uses the term "Officers,"
without more, and in a way that clearly includes federal legislators. In particu-
lar, Article I, Section 2 provides that "[t]he House of Representatives shall
chuse their Speaker and other Officers";2' and Section 3 similarly provides that
"[t]he Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro
tempore."22 Thus, the Speaker is an "Officer" in at least one constitutional
sense-an "Officer" of the legislature. If the Succession Clause's open-ended
reference to "Officer[s]" includes every person whom the Constitution at some
point labels an "Officer" (and not just those who are Officers under or of the
United States), then the Speaker might be constitutionally eligible for
succession.
15. For a discussion of the distinction between executive officers and legislators in a criminal
context, see Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 369-70 (1906) (holding that a U.S. Senator was not
removed "ipsofacto" by criminal conviction, because he was not an officer "under the govemment of
the United States" within the meaning of the criminal statute). By contrast, criminal conviction often
automatically effects removal from executive or judicial offices. For an excellent general discussion, see
Maria Simon, Note, Bribery and Other Not So "Good Behavior": Criminal Prosecution as a Supple-
ment to Impeachment of Federal Judges, 94 CoLum. L. REv. 1617 (1994).
16. E.g., 2 TiH REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVm=nON OF 1787, at 532, 535, 573 (Max Farrand
ed. 1966) [hereinafter REcoRDs].
17. Id. at 535.
18. Id. at 573, 599; see Silva, supra note 13, at 457 (noting that the Committee of Style had
authority to consolidate and clarify, but not to change, substantive provisions).
19. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886).
20. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Feb. 21, 1792), in 14 THE PAPERS OF
JAMEs MADiSON 235, 235 (Robert A. Rutland, Thomas A. Mason, Robert J. Brugger, Jeanne K. Sisson,
& Fredrika J. Teute eds., 1983); see also 93 CONG. REc. 7769, 7772, 8629 (1947) (statements of Sen.
Hatch and Rep. Gwynne, who relied on Madison's views to oppose legislative succession); William F.
Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Realities of Presidential Succession: "The Emperor Has No
Clones," 75 GEo. L. J. 1389, 1425 (1987) (similar). Several members of the First and Second Con-
gresses voiced similar views. See JOHN D. FEmucK, FROM FAr No HANDs: Tan STORY OF PRESIDEN-
TiL SuccEssioN 57-59 (1965); Silva, supra note 13, at 457-58.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (emphasis added).
22. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 (emphasis added).
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At first glance, this reading of the Succession Clause seems textually plau-
sible. But anyone who embraces it must address Article VI's oath requirement,
which also speaks in terms of generic "Officers. '23 And Article VI's reference
to "Officers" ranges beyond federal officials, and explicitly includes "Officers
... of the several States."'24 Thus, if the Succession Clause really does use the
term "Officer" in its broadest constitutional sense, then, as a textual matter,
Congress could theoretically designate a state government official to fill an
empty White House. While the Constitution nowhere explicitly forecloses this
result, it seems odd given: (1) the Framers' clear intent to create a stronger and
more national central government than had previously existed; (2) the obvious
state favoritism and disuniformity such a succession rule would invite (al-
lowing Congress to designate, say, the Governor of Virginia as the ex officio
successor);25 and (3) the existence of another equally (if not more) plausible
reading identified above.26
And the Article VI "Officer" clause cuts against legislative succession in
yet another way. Although its oath requirement applies to all state governmen-
tal figures, Article VI explicitly distinguishes between "Members of the several
State Legislatures," on the one hand, and "executive and judicial Officers...
of the several States" on the other. So too, it distinguishes "Senators and Rep-
resentatives" from "Officers... of the United States." 27 This carefully chosen
language strongly reinforces the Constitution's global officer/legislator
distinction.28
23. See ia art. VI, cl. 3.
24. Id.
25. Conflicts between large and small, urban and rural, eastern and western, and northern and
southern states made compromise at the Constitutional Convention difficult. Undoubtedly, a provision
endowing Congress with power to pick any one state's leader as successor to the Presidency would have
engendered fierce debate in Philadelphia, along with some record of that heated discussion. The ab-
sence of such a debate suggests that few read the Succession Clause to include state officers.
Later, in the First Congress, Elbridge Gerry implausibly claimed that state officers were indeed
eligible to succeed, 2 ANNALs OF CONG. 1913 (Jan. 13, 1791), and in the Second Congress, Gerry voted
for legislative succession, 3 ANNALs OF CONG. 302-03 (Jan. 2, 1792). Madison and several other Phila-
delphia Framers took a quite different position. See FamucK, supra note 20, at 57-62; Silva, supra note
13, at 457-59.
26. It might be argued that an intermediate reading of the Succession Clause is possible-one that
insists that a successor be a federal, rather than state, Officer, without requiring the successor to be an
"Officer of the United States." Though analytically possible, this superfine distinction lacks strong
textual support, and runs up against important historical and structural objections. Historically, we must
remember that some of the most prominent proponents of legislative eligibility also believed in state
officer eligibility. See note 25 supra (discussing Elbridge Gerry's thoughts on presidential succession).
Structurally, we should remember that, prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, a Senator was seen as an
agent of his state government in some ways. E.g., 2 A~NNALs OF CONG. 1904 (Jan. 10, 1791) (remarks of
James Madison) ("[T]he President pro tern. of the Senate .... will be a Senator of some particular State,
liable to be instructed by the State."); id. at 1913 (Jan. 13, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Smith) ("[T]he
President [pro tempore] of the Senate... was the Representative of a particular State, and bound to obey
the instructions of it.').
27. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (emphasis added) ("The Senators and Representatives before men-
tioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both
of the United States and of the several States .... 2).
28. The distinction asserts itself yet again in a later amendment providing sanctions for violations
of the Article VI Oath Clause. Id. amend. XIV, § 3 ("No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress... or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States... who, having previously
November 1995]
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B. Structural Considerations
Happily, we need not be limited to the isolated constitutional provisions
identified above when we decide which reading of the Succession Clause ought
to prevail. Instead, we must remember that it is "a [C]onstitution we are ex-
pounding." 29 Within the Constitution inheres a structure, a set of themes and
overarching principles that furnish backdrops against which any single provi-
sion must be interpreted. At least five structural arguments militate against
reading the Succession Clause to include the Speaker of the House. We present
these five in two clusters, beginning with three basic principles of separation of
powers before considering a pair of practical and logistical issues.
1. Separation of powers.
The ban on congressional office-holding and the resignation problem.
Consider first the logical implications of the Constitution's rule that sitting
Members of Congress may not hold executive office. This clear and emphatic
rule, laid down in the Incompatibility Clause,30 sharply distinguishes the Amer-
ican constitutional system of separated powers from British-style, parliamen-
tary government. The Framers self-consciously rejected the governmental
model embodied by eighteenth century Prime Minister Robert Walpole, who
served simultaneously as the leading Member of Parliament and the Chief Ex-
ecutive Minister-simultaneously as Speaker and President in American con-
stitutional parlance.31 In addition to the Incompatibility Clause itself, yet
another emphatic rejection of the Walpole model appears in Article I, Section
3, preventing simultaneous service as Chief Executive and Chief Legislator.
The Vice President may no longer preside over the Senate, "when he shall
exercise the Office of President of the United States." 32
To see the implications of all this for presidential succession, recall that a
President's disability may be only temporary. Indeed, the Succession Clause
provides that the "Officer" identified by congressional law to assume the pow-
ers of the Presidency when both President and Vice President are unable "shall
then act as President ... until the Disability be removed."33 Imagine a case in
which a President becomes incapacitated and the Vice President who replaces
him then dies. Pursuant to the Succession Clause, Congress will have specified
by law which "Officer" shall assume the Presidency. If Congress designates
the Speaker as such an officer (as section 19 purports to do), then the Speaker
must resign his House seat before taking over the Oval Office. Failure to re-
sign would constitute a patent violation of the Incompatibility Clause rule that
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State... ") (emphasis added).
29. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
30. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
31. For an outstanding general discussion, see Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 9.
32. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (emphasis added).
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no sitting Senator or Representative may hold executive or judicial office.34
(Imagine the constitutional spectacle of a Speaker presiding over the House as
it considers articles of impeachment against him as Acting President.) 35
But what happens if the President recovers? Having already resigned, the
Speaker cannot simply go back to his old House seat; indeed, a successor Rep-
resentative may already have been elected.36 Nor would the President neces-
sarily want to nominate him as the new Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment.3 7 This quandary will not arise if the term "Officer" in the Succes-
sion Clause refers only to officials (like the Secretary of State or Attorney Gen-
eral) who can retain their posts throughout service as Acting President-and
even after a recovered President reclaims the reins.38
Madison clearly thought that a Cabinet official could keep his Cabinet post
while serving as Acting President.39 And so said Senator Hoar, author of the
Succession Act of 1886,40 and various other members of Congress, in debates
over the Act.41 As adopted, the Act provided for Cabinet succession but did
not require resignation from the Cabinet before assumption of the Presidency.
Although as a practical matter it might seem hard to serve as both Acting Presi-
dent and, say, Secretary of State, one's duties in the latter capacity could
largely be delegated to undersecretaries. 42 As one Congressman put the point
in 1792, "it is of the nature of Executive power to be transferrable [sic] to
34. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. Section 19 explicitly requires resignation from the
legislature before assumption of the Presidency. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1), (b) (1994).
A quibbler might try to argue that the President does not, strictly speaking, "hold[] ... Office
under the United States," and is instead a sui generis figure. But Article II provides that the President
shall "hold his Ofice" for a four-year term, U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added), prescribes
an oath for "the Office of President of the United States," id. art II, § 1, cl. 8 (emphasis added), and
further provides that the President "shall be removed from Office on Impeachment... and Conviction,"
id. art. II, § 4 (emphasis added). More importantly, the anti-Walpolian spirit underlying the Incompati-
bility Clause would have barred, for example, President George Washington from simultaneously serv-
ing as a Virginia Senator.
35. This is, of course, precisely the kind of spectacle the Framers explicitly rejected. See text
accompanying note 32 supra; text accompanying notes 50-68 infra.
36. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 ("When vacancies happen in the Representation from any
State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies."); see also
Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 1395, 1436-37 (discussing the dangers of § 19 successors
resigning posts only to have the President recover and resume his duties). For a discussion of the
Speaker's ability to resign his legislative seat but remain (a nonmember) Speaker, see note 48 infra.
37. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XXV, § 2. For more discussion of this Amendment, see text accompany-
ing notes 89-101 infra.
38. It is an interesting question whether, under incompatibility principles, judges would have to
resign judicial appointments before succeeding to the post of Acting President. The Incompatibility
Clause prevents simultaneous service as legislator and judge, or legislator and executive official, but it
does not explicitly prohibit simultaneous executive and judicial officeholding. Calabresi & Larsen,
supra note 9, at 1047. In the First Congress, Madison objected to the Chief Justice succeeding to a
vacant Presidency on the ground that it would be "blending the Judiciary and Executive." 2 ANNALs oF
CON. 1904 (Jan. 10, 1791); see also id. at 1912-13 (Jan. 13, 1791) (recording the similar views of Reps.
Baldwin and Smith).
39. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 20, at 236; Silva, supra note 13,
at 464-65.
40. Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, § 1, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947).
41. FmERcK, supra note 20, at 145; Silva, supra note 13, at 465-66 & n.57.
42. 2 ANNALs OF CoNG. 1904 (Jan. 10, 1791) (recording that Madison "showed the compatibility
of the two offices" of President and Secretary of State).
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subordinate officers; but Legislative authority is incommunicable, and cannot
be transferred. '43
Indeed, Madison, Hoar, and many others went a step further and insisted
that an ascending officer not only could, but must retain his predicate office in
order to become and remain Acting President. 4 In their view, the predicate
office was the basis for ascension; when it lapsed, so did one's entitlement to
be the "Officer [who] shall ... act as President" under the Succession Clause.45
Put another way, Congress can designate only officers, not private citizens, to
act as President; the moment an officer resigns, he becomes a mere citizen and
is thus ineligible to succeed to or remain in the Oval Office.
In effect, Madison and others argued that Congress could annex presidential
powers only ex officio-that is, to some fixed office, not a person.4 6 Subtle
but strong textual support for Madison's reading comes from the fact that the
Succession Clause empowers Congress to declare "what Officer"--not "the
Officer who"--shall act as President.47
These points, once again, undermine the Speaker's eligibility under section
19. To refuse to resign the Speakership would be constitutionally outrageous:
to act simultaneously as President/Chief Executive Officer and Speaker of the
House is to be precisely the kind of Walpolian Prime Minister our Constitu-
tion's text, history, and structure self-consciously reject.48 But to resign one's
43. 3 ANNALS OF CoNo. 712 (Nov. 21, 1792) (statement of Rep. Findley); see also Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 425 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[U]nlike executive power, judicial and
legislative powers have never been thought delegable."); Charles S. Hamlin, The Presidential Succes-
sion Act of 1886, 18 H~Av. L. REv. 182, 188 (1905) (noting Senator Hoar's 1882 argument that legisla-
tive and presidential duties were incompatible, whereas the Secretary of State could delegate to
assistants); Silva, supra note 13, at 465 (noting congressional sentiment in the 1880s that executive but
not legislative duties were delegable). For further analysis, see Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 569 (1994) (alluding to the
nondelegable nature of legislative power); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State,
107 HARv. L. REv. 1231, 1243 n.72 (1994) (discussing the delegability of executive powers and nondel-
egability of legislative duties). See generally Richard D. Friedman, Some Modest Proposals on the
Vice-Presidency, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1703, 1714-24 (1988) (supporting the idea of simultaneous execu-
tive/executive officeholding); see also FEEaICK, supra note 20, at 192-93, 201-02, 212-13,231-32, 277
(noting various executive positions held by Vice Presidents at Presidents' request or ex officio).
44. See Silva, supra note 13, at 465-66.
45. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (emphasis added).
46. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
47. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (emphasis added); see also Letter from James Madison to Ed-
mund Pendleton, supra note 20, at 236 (reproducing Madison's emphasis of the words "what officers"
in making his ex officio argument).
48. For further discussion of the Constitution's break with the Walpole Model, see generally Cala-
bresi & Larsen, supra note 9. Section 19 explicitly requires an ascending Speaker to resign the Speaker-
ship. See note 34 supra and accompanying text (explaining the requirement in constitutional terms).
It might be argued that we should distinguish between House Representatives and the Speaker, and
that the Speaker need not even be a member of the House. Thus, even though the Incompatibility
Clause requires that one resign as Representative to become President, one need not resign as the
Speaker. Though clever, this argument fails. For starters, one could counterargue that when the House
chooses "their Speaker" under Article I, Section 2, they must choose one of themselves. Historically,
the Speaker and President pro tempore have always been sitting legislators.
In any event, the clear logic of Article I prevents a person from acting simultaneously as President
and presiding officer of the legislature, even if he is not a Senator or Representative: The Vice Presi-
dent-who is not a Senator-may not preside over the Senate "when he shall exercise the Office of
President of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5. Most important, a Speaker holds his
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Speakership is, under Madison's reading, to pull the constitutional rug out from
under one's own feet, destroying one's status as an "Officer" eligible to "act as
President" under the Succession Clause (assuming a Speaker even qualifies as
a Succession Clause "Officer"). And so, on this logic, the Speaker is ineligible
to act as President whether or not he resigns as Speaker.
In the end, the text and structure of the Constitution permit multiple of-
ficeholding within the executive branch, but clearly ban parliamentary-style ex-
ecutive/legislative blending. The clear implications of all this argue strongly
that members of Congress cannot be "officers" within the meaning of the Suc-
cession Clause.49
Impeachment process integrity and the conflict of interest problem. A sec-
ond and critically important structural theme is the Constitution's pervasive
fear of conflict of interest. Concern that individuals not judge their own causes
infused both the writings of the Founders50 and the constitutional framework
itself. An important textual embodiment of the self-dealing concern appears in
the Emoluments Clause: "No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time
for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority
of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments
whereof shall have been encreased during such time. '51 The clear purpose of
this provision was to remove the direct, immediate, and personal conflict of
interest federal legislators might otherwise have when enacting laws creating
(or making more lucrative) any federal executive or judicial offices.52
When we move from voting in the legislative arena to voting in judicial
proceedings, 53 the conflict-of-interest concern only heightens. Consider the
Chief Justice Clause of Article I: "[w]hen the President of the United States is
tried [in a Senate impeachment proceeding], the Chief Justice shall preside."'54
To understand the reasons for and import of this provision, we must ask who
"office" at the pleasure of the House. If he must remain in this office in order to act as President, as the
Madisonian reading insists, then his service as President wholly depends on the will of a simple House
majority, in obvious violation of the Constitution's rejection of the Walpole Prime Minister Model. See
text accompanying notes 69-76 infra. Similar logic applies to the President pro tempore.
49. Even if one rejects Madison's ex officio reading that a Cabinet officer must keep his old post,
the clear constitutional fact that he may do so-while the Speaker may not-argues strongly against
legislative succession in situations where a President suffers a temporary disability. By textual implica-
tion, if legislators fail to qualify as officers for temporary disability purposes, neither should they qualify
in cases of death or removal.
50. See eg., Ti FEDEAiusr No. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("No
man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment,
and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.").
51. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. For a fun general discussion, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is
LloydBentsen Unconstitutional?, 46 STAN. L. Rsv. 907 (1994) (contending that the appointment of Sen.
Bentsen as Treasury Secretary violated the Emoluments Clause).
52. The Emoluments Clause speaks of "Offices]" and thus does not address the conflict-of-inter-
est issues raised by Congressmen voting themselves pay increases as legislators. To address this self-
dealing problem, a different constitutional solution was proposed-the First Congress' original Second
Amendment, now ratified (it seems) as our Twenty-Seventh Amendment. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1145-46 (1991).
53. See generally Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80
CORNmLL L. Rn'. 203 (1995) (likening voting in the judicial/jury context to other kinds of voting).
54. U.S. Co-sr. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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would otherwise be entitled to preside over impeachment proceedings in the
Senate. The answer, of course, is the permanent President (or presider) of the
Senate-the Vice President of the United States.55
It should be obvious why the Constitution does not permit the Vice Presi-
dent to participate in an impeachment proceeding whose result could vault him
into the Oval Office: He would be presiding over a judicial proceeding in
which he had a huge, direct, immediate, and personal stake. In effect, the Vice
President would be judging his own cause. (For similar reasons, the Constitu-
tion expressly prohibits the Vice President, when serving as Acting President,
from presiding over the Senate; otherwise, if the Senate sat to impeach the
Acting President, the Vice President would be presiding in his own trial.) 56
This simple and obvious conflict-of-interest problem has far-reaching implica-
tions for the question of presidential succession in general and the current fed-
eral succession statute in particular. Simply put, section 19 may warp the
judgment of the Speaker and the President pro tempore when they are called
upon to participate judicially in impeachment proceedings against the President
and/or Vice President. (Recall that the Constitution vests the sole power to
"impeach"--to indict-the President and/or Vice President in the House,57 act-
ing as a kind of grand jury; and vests the sole power to "try" the case in the
Senate,58 acting as judge and petit jury.) Successful impeachment and convic-
tion of either the President or Vice President would materially enhance the
likelihood that section 19 would come into play. The structure of the Constitu-
tion simply does not permit participants in the impeachment process to have
such a direct, immediate, personal stake in the outcome.5 9
55. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 ("The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Sen-
ate."). During debates over the Constitution, considerable controversy arose over the "amphibious"
nature of the Vice President, an impeachable executive branch officer, id. art. II, § 4, with legislative
duties, id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. Given that this relatively minor blending of executive and legislative powers
caused so much concern, it is hard to believe that the far more troubling blend embodied in legislative
succession to the Presidency-the Chief Executive Office-would not have inspired debate. Seem-
ingly, the Founders never truly expected that legislators might claim to be eligible "Officers" under the
Succession Clause. (We are indebted to Gary Lawson for this point.)
56. See text accompanying note 32 supra; note 59 infra.
57. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
58. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
59. This general principle suggests that, because of the role he is constitutionally assigned in
impeachment, the Chief Justice himself is not eligible for presidential succession, even though he is an
"Officer of the United States." (Put another way, the clear logic of the Chief Justice Clause supplements
the words of the Succession Clause and renders the Chief Justice ineligible.) See 2 AiNNA.s OF CONG.
1911 (Jan. 13, 1791) (citing Rep. Livermore's reservations about including the Chief Justice as a succes-
sion candidate because of his impeachment role); Hamlin, supra note 43, at 187 (noting 1856 Judiciary
Committee recommendations that the Chief Justice follow the President pro tempore and Speaker in the
succession line, provided he did not preside at the President's impeachment). General conflict-of-inter-
est principles similarly preclude the Vice President from presiding over his ovm impeachment proceed-
ings. (This too is a rather clear entailment of the Chief Justice Clause and the Acting President Clause
of Article I, Section 3, Clause 5, which here might be re-labelled the "Mandatory Vice-Presidential
Recusal Clauses." See text accompanying notes 32 & 56 supra.)
It could be argued that the best way to deal with the pervasive conflict-of-interest problem is not to
read the Succession Clause straightforwardly as excluding all legislators, but to read the Constitution
generally to require any legislators mentioned in § 19 to recuse themselves from presidential and vice-
presidential impeachment proceedings. But this limited recusal scheme does not address the fact that
legislative succession corrupts the whole legislative body, not just individual leaders. Worse still, it
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It is true, of course, that the impeachment process has a political compo-
nent. But impeachment is also clearly ajudicial proceeding, 60 and the rules of
judicial ethics apply. For instance, Senators must be "on Oath or Affirmation"
when sitting as a court of impeachment.61 And the most basic rule of judicial
ethics is that a person may not judge her own case.
Concern about self-dealing in the impeachment and succession contexts is
more than just paranoia. Consider, for example, the 1868 impeachment pro-
ceedings of President Andrew Johnson, who succeeded to the Presidency after
President Lincoln's assassination in 1865. At that time (and until the passage
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1967) no constitutional means existed for
filling a vice-presidential vacancy; 62 thus Senate conviction of President John-
son would have triggered the federal succession statute then in effect-the Act
of 1792-which placed the President pro tempore first in line.63 Senator Ben-
jamin Wade, the President pro tempore at the time, vigorously participated in
the trial and voted to convict Johnson.64 Indeed, Wade had apparently already
selected his new Cabinet when he cast his impeachment vote.65 Needless to
say, Wade's participation in the trial was soundly criticized at the time,66 and
was one of the factors that led Congress in 1886 to remove the President pro
tempore and the Speaker from the statutory succession line, providing instead
for Cabinet succession.67 In 1947, a misguided Congress repealed the 1886
warps the entire presidential selection process created by the Constitution. See text accompanying notes
69-76 infra. Moreover, legislators may not recuse themselves when they should. See text accompany-
ing notes 62-65 infra (discussing the Johnson impeachment). A recalcitrant President pro tempore
might also claim that mandatory recusal would deprive his state of its constitutionally guaranteed "equal
Suffrage in the Senate." See U.S. CoNSr. art V; 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1903 (Jan. 10, 1791) (detailing
remarks of Rep. Smith on how a State would be deprived of a Senate vote should the President pro
tempore be allowed to succeed to the Presidency); id, at 1913 (Jan. 13, 1791) (same); FEEacK, supra
note 20, at 114 (noting objections to President pro tempore Wade's participation in the Johnson im-
peachment and counterarguments that his exclusion would deprive Ohio of its vote).
Further, if the suggestion is made that courts can require recusal, we must acknowledge that espe-
cially tricky problems arise from judicial interference into the impeachment process, because in im-
peachment the Senate acts as a court. Other courts must thus observe the rules of comity and res
judicata when asked to enjoin legislative leaders from trying an impeachment. Judicial enforcement of
our reading of the Succession Clause would at least avoid these special justiciability problems.
60. See text accompanying note 58 supra. Note also that Article I speaks in terms of "Judgment"
in "Cases" of Impeachment, and gives the Senate the exclusive power to "try" and "convict[ ]" in such
"Cases." U.S. CONsr. art I, § 3, cl. 6-7. Articles II and III likewise describe impeachment as a kind of
criminal proceeding. See i1 art. II, § 4; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. For general discussions of impeachment
as a judicial proceeding, see CHARLEs L. BLAcK, JR., IMPEAcHMENT: A HANDBOOK (1974); Vik D.
Amar, Note, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALF L.J. 1111, 1114-15 (1988).
61. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 3, cI. 6.
62. See text accompanying notes 89-101 infra (discussing the Twenty-Fifth Amendment).
63. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886).
64. FEEucK, supra note 20, at 114; Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 1420 & n.107; Silva,
supra note 13, at 451-52.
65. JOHN D. FEmCK, THE TwEr'--FTHr AMENDMENT: ITS CoMPLET HISTORY AND APPLiCA-
,noNs 214 (2d ed. 1992).
66. Id. at 214; see also FamucK, supra note 20, at 114 (noting Senator Thomas Hendricks' objec-
tion to Wade's sitting in judgment over Johnson and Hendricks' belief that the President pro tempore,
like the Vice President, must recuse himself from impeachment proceedings).
67. Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, § 1, 24 Stat. 1-2 (repealed 1947); see also Brown & Cinquegrana,
supra note 20, at 1420-21. For a discussion of the Act of 1886, see notes 126-128 infra and accompany-
ing text.
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law and enacted the current version of section 19, reestablishing legislative
succession, with the Speaker first in line, followed by the President pro
tempore. 68
The Electoral College Model and the problem of creeping prime ministeri-
alization. Closely related to the self-dealing concern is another core separation
of powers issue: the Constitution's fundamental rejection of a parliamentary
system in which the legislature, or its dominant party, elects its own leader as
Prime Minister/Chief Executive Officer. The problem in 1868 was not just that
Ben Wade sat as a judge, and, in effect, ruled for himself; it was that the entire
Senate and the party Wade led all sat as judges, and many ruled for their own
leader-ruled, in effect, to anoint themselves presidential electors. By making
Wade, a legislator, eligible to succeed to the Presidency, the 1792 Act cor-
rupted the entire judicial proceeding. The Act tempted the whole Senate to act
in a personal, partisan, and political-rather than judicial-manner.
Worse yet, the 1792 Act tempted the legislature to exercise a political
power the Constitution took great pains to deny: the power to pick its own
leader as President. As we have noted, one of the most basic decisions at Phila-
delphia was to break with the parliamentary Prime Minister Model represented
by Robert Walpole: Congress would not have free rein to pick a President.
Instead, the Constitution adopted an Electoral College Model, under which an
assortment of electors independent of Congress would pick a President. Article
II went so far as to bar individual members of Congress from serving as presi-
dential electors.69 It is true that if the electors deadlocked, Congress would
resolve the impasse, but only by picking among those candidates with the most
electoral college votes.70 Congress would not have complete discretion merely
to pick its own leader as President.71 This basic Electoral College Model was
preserved by the Twelfth Amendment, refined by the Twentieth, and extended
by the Twenty-Fifth, which requires Congressional approval of a President's
nominee to fill a vice-presidential vacancy, but does not allow Congress to fill
that vacancy itself.72
The basic rationale for the Electoral College Model is clear: A person
should not become President merely by currying favor with the legislature.73
68. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1), (b) (1994); see also Silva, supra note 13, at 456 (describing the provisions
of the Act of 1947). Although the Speaker might seem to have a less dramatic conflict of interest than
the President pro tempore, who sits in final judgment, recall that in impeachment the Speaker is analo-
gous to a grand jury foreman.
69. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ('[N]o Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of
Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector."). Note, once again, the clear
legislator/officer distinction highlighted in this clause.
70. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
71. In the case of Johnson's impeachment, it might be argued that Benjamin Wade's leadership
position was largely formal, and that the true political leader of the Senate in 1868 was Senator William
Fessenden. This claim, even if true, misses the point. Nothing in the Constitution would have prevented
the Senate from electing its "true leader" as President pro tempore moments before casting a final vote
to convict Andrew Johnson.
72. See notes 89-92 infra and accompanying text (discussing Congress' role in the provisions of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment).
73. See generally MICHAEL J. GLENNON, WHEN No MAJoarry RusL.s: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
AND P aSXnmENAL SuccEssioN 8 (1992) (reporting that "most in Philadelphia opposed congressional
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Yet this is precisely what can happen if we read the term "Officer" in the Suc-
cession Clause to include legislators. 74 The Constitution's general Electoral
College Model does give Congress a (now rare) role in selecting Presidents
when electors are deadlocked. Congress also participates in filling a vacant
Vice-Presidency by confirming the President's nominee for that post.75 How-
ever, in both instances, Congress is limited to choosing among those "nomi-
nated" by continental institutions 76 outside of Congress-the Electoral College
or (in the case of vice-presidential vacancy) the Presidency. Consistent with
the basic spirit of the Electoral College model, we should read the term "Of-
ficer" in the Succession Clause to include presidential "nominees"-executive
and judicial officers appointed via presidential nomination and commission-
but not congressional party leaders whom the Congress itself selects.
2. Logistics.
The "where" problem. Consider next the Constitution's concern with ge-
ography. "Geography preoccupied the founding generation .... [It] ramified
in every direction, influencing virtually every major issue considered by the
Philadelphia Convention... . -77 Where to locate various government person-
nel and institutions obsessed those who wrote and ratified the Constitution,
largely because location does affect (and did so much more in 1787) the smooth
running of government. For example, impeachment trials-suits that may tend
to distract government actors from discharging their duties-were explicitly
located in the Senate, in the nation's capital, in part because that is where geo-
graphic disruption would be minimized. 78 Similarly, part of Article III's un-
derlying logic is geographic: The requirement that suits involving ambassadors
be tried in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in the nation's capital,
reflected a concern over the disruption of ambassadors' official duties. 79
Given all this, we must ask what kind of event would cause the single larg-
est disruption in the smooth operation of the federal government? Clearly the
answer is the kind of catastrophe that triggers the succession statute-that is,
selection [of the President]"); Tim FEDERALIST No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the need to
keep the President independent of the legislature).
74. See Rutm C. SrIvA, PssmmMr.L SuccssioN 155-56 (Greenwood 1968) (1951). In effect,
legislative succession threatens to transform the American impeachment model-featuring a judicial
proceeding focused on presidential misconduct-into a British-style political vote of parliamentary no
confidence.
75. U.S. Co-4sT. amend. XXV, § 2; see text accompanying notes 89-92 infra.
76. See text accompanying notes 102-103 infra (observing that congressional members lack a
national electoral mandate, having been voted into office only by the people of a single state or district).
77. Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
56 U. Cm. L. REv. 443, 469-71 (1989).
78. THE FEDERALuSt No. 65, at 443-44 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (high-
lighting the disadvantages of geographically disperse impeachment participants); Akhil Reed Amar &
Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARv. L.
Ray. 701, 724-26 (1995) (arguing that civil suits against the President should be tried in the capital to
avoid disruption of duties).
79. Amar, supra note 77, at 469-78 (detailing examples of geography infusing the provisions of
Article III); Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L.
REv. 1499, 1560 n.222 (1990) (providing further elaboration).
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an event that deprives the country of its two elected executive officials. In
construing the scope of the Succession Clause, shouldn't we consider the geo-
graphic location of a would-be successor? At the Founding, high level execu-
tive officials, especially Cabinet members, were most likely to be in
Washington during a time of national crisis. Diligent federal legislators, in-
eluding the Speaker, tended to, and were supposed to, split their time between
the capital and the people they represented. Indeed, in the early Republic,
Americans expected that legislators would typically meet in short sessions and
quickly return back home to live (like everyone else) under the laws just made.
Article I's Arrest Clause explicitly focused on this geographic reality in its
reference to federal legislators "going to and returning from" the capital.80
During the First Congress, in debates over presidential vacancy, Represen-
tative Carroll argued against legislative succession, and in favor of Cabinet
succession, in geographical terms: "[T]he vacancy might happen in the recess
of the Legislature, or in the absence of the President of the Senate; the Secre-
tary of State would always be at the seat of Government."8' Moments later,
Representative Smith echoed the point: "[T]he office of Secretary of State and
the duties of President were analogous. He was a kind of assistant to the Chief
Magistrate, and would, therefore, very properly supply his place; besides, he
was always at the seat of Government." 82
Though geography looms less large today, it did inform the Founders'
drafting and thus casts some light on what was the most sensible reading of the
Succession Clause when enacted. Even in today's jet age, there remains an
impulse that location counts-an impulse that helps explain Secretary of State
Alexander Haig's attempt to reassure the country, in the wake of the assassina-
tion attempt on President Reagan in 1981, that someone was "in control here,
in the White House."83
The "when" problem. A related structural argument concerns time. The
President and the executive officers who serve beneath him are on duty-in
office-without break or interruption, 365 days a year. Federal legislators, in-
cluding the Speaker, do the people's business only while Congress is in session.
The Constitution requires only that "the Congress shall assemble at least once
in every Year."84 Beyond that, the length and frequency of congressional ses-
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. For a modem textual reflection of geographic concern, see id.
amend. XXV, § 4 (providing a 48-hour period to assemble should Congress not be in session at the time
of an emergency in the Oval Office).
81. 2 AiNats oF CONG. 1912 (Jan. 13, 1791).
82. Id. at 1913-14 (Jan. 13, 1791).
83. Questions Raised: Who Was In Charge?. 39 CONG. Q. WVKLY. REP. 580 (1981) (emphasis
added). Haig further remarked "Constitutionally, gentlemen, you have the president, the vice president
and the secretary of state in that order .... " Id. He was widely mocked at the time for ignoring the
Speaker and President pro tempore, but, "constitutionally" speaking, Haig was dead right. If federal
legislators are constitutionally ineligible, as we argue in this article, the Secretary of State is indeed next
in line under the succession act. See note 2 supra. Could it be that with these words Haig was staking
out his constitutional claim?
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2.
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sions are for Congress itself to determine by law.8 5 Indeed, during the first
hundred years following constitutional ratification, "there were frequent and
lengthy vacancies in the offices of President pro tempore and Speaker."'86 Even
today, the House is, strictly speaking, not a continuing body 87 and must elect
new officers every two years. By its very nature, therefore, the Speakership is
not a continuous office.s8 Yet, who would dispute the importance of filling a
Presidential vacancy immediately after an event triggering section 19 occurs?
When defining eligible "Officers" within the meaning of the Succession
Clause, we should bear in mind that Speakers have never been continuously on
the job like federal executive and judicial officers.
In sum, whether we consider the deep implications of the Constitution's
separation of powers and its rejection of a Parliamentary/Prime Minister model
or focus on the more mundane, practical issues of time and place, we reach the
same conclusion: The Constitution's structure strongly suggests that legislators
are simply not Succession Clause "Officers."
C. Subsequent Constitutional Developments
Thus far, we have looked at textual and structural arguments that could
have been (and in many cases were) made in the Founding era. But do more
recent changes to the Constitution reinforce or undermine these arguments?
1. The Tiventy-Fifth Amendment.
The enactment of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1967 makes our struc-
tural attack on section 19 even more forceful. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment
provides, among other things, a means of filling a vice-presidential vacancy.
As we have already noted, the original Constitution did not give a President any
authority to replace a Vice President who died or left office.89 The Twenty-
Fifth Amendment now directs Presidents faced with a vice-presidential vacancy
85. The President may, of course, convene Congress in emergencies. Id. art. II, § 3. But what
happens when the Presidency is vacant? For an argument that presidential and vice-presidential vacan-
cies occurring when neither House is in session creates the possibility of no existing successor and no
constitutional means of selecting one, see Silva, supra note 13, at 452, 472 n.83. See also Brown &
Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 1419 n. 106 (discussing how President Arthur, who had no Vice President
immediately after he replaced President Garfield, drafted a proclamation calling Congress into special
session if, and only if, he died).
86. Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 1419; see also FEacK, supra note 20, at 90 n.t
(describing "lame duck" sessions of Congress between election and commencement of the new term and
the long gap between the beginning of the new term and the seating of the new Congress); Hamlin,
supra note 43, at 183 (noting historical reality that at times both offices of Speaker and President pro
tempore have been vacant); Silva, supra note 13, at 452 nA (describing nine-month lapses in congres-
sional sessions).
87. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 512 (1975) (citing Gojack v.
United States, 384 U.S. 702, 706 n.4 (1966); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 181 (1927)).
88. See 3 ANrN..s oF CoNG. 281 (Dec. 22, 1791) (remarks of Rep. white) ("[T]he Speaker was
not a permanent officer, if he could be considered as one in any point of view."); id. (remarks of Rep.
Giles) ("[T]he Constitution refers to some permanent officer to be created pursuant to the provisions
therein contained. [The Speaker and President pro tempore] are not permanent... the subject was not
to be left to any casualty, if it could possibly be prevented.").
89. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
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to "nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of both Houses of Congress."90 If the Speaker and President pro
tempore are "Officers" who can ascend to the Presidency, then the same con-
flict-of-interest problem we saw with regard to impeachment now arises with
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment's requirement that both houses of Congress ap-
prove vice-presidential nominees. For example, think about congressional con-
sideration of a vice-presidential nominee put forth by a President who herself
has years remaining in her term. Do we really want the Speaker and President
pro tempore to wield power in a confirmation process that might hugely de-
crease their own chances to ascend? Would we be surprised if the confirmation
process bogged down, or perhaps even stalled? 91 Doesn't construing the Suc-
cession Clause to include the Speaker as an "Officer" undermine the objective
to which the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is dedicated-namely, the prompt and
orderly replacement of departed Vice Presidents?92
Consider, in this regard, the shrewd remarks of two of the most able men at
the Philadelphia Convention: James Wilson and James Madison. In response
to early proposals that put the Chief Senator next in line for a vacant Presidency
and also gave the Senate a role in presidential selection, Wilson worried that
the Senate "might have an interest in throwing dilatory obstacles in the way" of
presidential selection.93 Days later, Madison seconded the point: "[T]he Sen-
ate might retard the appointment of a [U.S.] President in order to carry points
whilst the revisionary [veto] power was in the President of their own body."94
Here too, our concern that a conflict of interest may lead to harmful legisla-
tive foot-dragging reflects not abstract fanciful fears, but actual historical expe-
rience. It took a Democratically controlled Congress no less than 121 days to
confirm Republican Nelson Rockefeller as Vice President in 1974.95 Had
something happened to Republican President Gerald Ford during this four
month window, Democrat Speaker Carl Albert would have moved into the
Oval Office under section 19.
Granted, Rockefeller's questionable financial dealings raised genuine issues
about his fitness to serve as either Vice President or President.96 But the 1947
Act created bad incentives for Congress to string things out, rather than deliber-
ate with dispatch and then vote up or down on Rockefeller. 97 Even if the con-
90. U.S. CoNsr amend. XXV, § 2 (emphasis added).
91. See Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 1403-04 & nn.55-57, 1414-15 (demonstrating
the dangers of partisan politics disrupting the confirmation process and suggesting reform through either
limiting confirmation participants to members of the President's party or mandating a time limit on the
confirmation process).
92. Though § 19 was on the books when the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was adopted, nothing in
the Amendment's text or structure bestows any special constitutional blessing on § 19. To the contrary,
as we argue, the very structure of the Amendment undermines the § 19 scheme.
93. REcoRDs, supra note 16, at 402-03.
94. Id. at 427.
95. See FEaiucK, supra note 65, at 163-184 (chronicling the lengthy and controversial confirma-
tion of Rockefeller).
96. See id.
97. For responses to the delay, see id. at 176 n.* (noting objections of Sen. Scott, a Rockefeller
supporter, to Congress' decision to further postpone hearings); id. at 178 (quoting President Ford's
complaint that almost three months after Rockefeller's nomination, Congress should "fish or cut bait");
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flicts of interest created by the Act never actually affected congressional
behavior here, and in fact did not slow things down one bit, the Act still con-
tributed to the appearance of a self-dealing slowdown. In this respect, the
1947 Act repeated the mistake of the Act of 1792, which created the appear-
ance of impropriety when Ben Wade voted to convict Andrew Johnson in
1868, even though Johnson had in fact done things that raised real doubts about
his fitness for the Presidency.
Another section of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment creates further opportu-
nity for legislative self-dealing, should legislators be permitted to succeed to
the Presidency. Section 4 of the Amendment allows the Vice President, to-
gether with a majority of either the Cabinet or such other body as Congress
designates, to certify to the Congress that the President is unable to discharge
his duties.98 This certification can effectively remove the President from office
until the disability passes, making the Vice President Acting President.99 Of
course, a President alleged to be disabled might disagree, and the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment allows him to communicate such disagreement to Congress. In
such a case, Section 4 makes the two houses of Congress the ultimate judges of
the President's fitness for service.' 00 To the extent the legislative leaders rank
high up in the succession line, their final arbitration of such executive depart-
ment disputes may be infected by a direct and immediate conflict of interest.
Here again, permitting legislative succession creates the possibility that legisla-
tors will judge their own cases. 1'0
id. at 227-29 (suggesting that the ABA's 1974 proposal for a single joint House-Senate hearing would
have appropriately expedited Rockefeller's confirmation).
98. U.S. Co-sr. amend. XXV, § 4.
99. Ma
100. See id.
101. Given Cabinet officers' own place in the line of succession, one might worry that conflicts of
interest will infect their judgments about presidential disability. But the Twenty-Fifth Amendment gives
the Cabinet only the first, not the last, word on presidential disability. And even here, if Congress is
concerned about possible self-dealing it may displace the Cabinet's role altogether by substituting, for
example, a panel of disinterested medical experts. See Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 1415-
16. While the House, in impeachment, acts as a kind of grand jury, the Cabinet members here act more
like qui tam plaintiffs than judicial officers: They make no findings of misconduct, and may be replaced
by any body Congress chooses.
Moreover, Cabinet officials face very different strategic incentives than do legislators. Consider a
bad-faith Cabinet official cynically considering whether to deem an able President disabled to push
himself one notch higher on the succession chain. If the able President can convince a mere one-third-
plus-one of either House of her fitness, she will resume the reins and can immediately dismiss the bad-
faith official. Under the Amendment, by contrast, cynical legislators face neither this uncertainty about
whether the President will prevail (since they rule at the end), nor the prospect of immediate dismissal.
Also, in ruling against a disabled President, the collective Cabinet does not anoint itself an electoral
college: As a group, it may not designate its favorite Cabinet member "Secretary of State" and thus next
in line in the same way that each House may pick its favorite as the section 19 "Officer." Finally,
Cabinet officers, unlike Congress members, are typically handpicked by and work closely with the
President whose fitness is now in question; thus they are likely to be both loyal and knowledgeable
about any possible disability. SILVA, supra note 74, at 108. The Cabinet's special access to and knowl-
edge of the President's true status may be crucial in many disability cases. In the end, this unique
knowledge may outweigh any indirect self-dealing concerns raised by Cabinet succession.
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2. The populist Presidency.
Finally, we should take note of a powerful post-Founding development in
American constitutionalism: the rise of a populist, plebiscitarian Presidency.
At first, this trend might seem to support legislative succession-Representa-
tives and Senators (after the Seventeenth Amendment) are directly elected by
the people, but Cabinet officials are not. The People's President today, the
argument runs, should be elected, not appointed; thus, legislators, not Cabinet
officials, should head the succession lineup.
But the President is elected by a national electorate; Congressmen are not.
They represent the parts, not the whole.102 The narrow, local strategies by
which Congressmen secure election in their states and districts, with promises
of pork and parks, often do not reflect the national vision the People have
historically wanted their Presidents to possess. On this score, Cabinet officials
are more truly presidential: According to presidential scholar Steven Calabresi,
the "President and [his] accountable subordinates" are the "only representa-
tives of a national electoral constituency."'0 3
In 200 years, at least nine elected Presidents previously served in the Cabi-
net (not counting the Vice Presidency) and six of the nine served as Secretary
of State; but only one served as Speaker of the House. 104 To be sure, most of
these Cabinet-officer Presidents are nineteenth century figures. But of the six-
teen men elected President after 1900, five (the two Roosevelts, Taft, Hoover,
and Bush) had held Cabinet or sub-Cabinet executive office; four others (Coo-
lidge, Truman, Johnson, and Nixon) had served de facto in Cabinets as Vice
Presidents; and one other (Eisenhower) had served as an executive department
General.' 0 5 Only five (Harding, Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon) had
served as Senators; while seven (both Roosevelts, Wilson, Coolidge, Carter,
Reagan, and Clinton) came to the Oval Office as former state chief executives
with no service in either the House or Senate.' 0 6 Although four (Kennedy,
Johnson, Nixon, and Bush) had served (typically) brief stints in the House early
in their careers, none came directly from the House of Representatives to the
Oval Office. Only one of the sixteen (Johnson) was a true congressional
leader.I0 7
Of course, the Speaker and the President pro tempore are chosen as leaders
by their respective Houses, which do span the country; but a Cabinet official is
102. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435-36 (1819); SILVA, supra note 74,
at 157-58.
103. Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 Amu. L. Rnv.
23, 58-70 (1995) (emphasis added; capitalization altered).
104. See SILVA, supra note 74, at 159 (citing similar figures); see also FEEicK, supra note 20, at
267 (noting the "executive competency" of former Secretaries of State, including "John Marshall,
Daniel Webster, John C. Calhoun, William H. Seward, John Hay, Elihu Root, William Jennings Bryan,
Robert Lansing, Charles E. Hughes, Henry L. Stimson, Cordell Hull, James F. Byrnes, George C. Mar-
shall, and John Foster Dulles"). In addition, Henry Clay and James G. Blaine each served as both House
Speaker and Secretary of State. Id.
105. JOSEPH NATHAN KANE, FACTs ABour THE PREsIDENs: A COMPILATION OF BioGRtAPmcAI.
AND HIsroRIcAL INFoRMATION 333-34 (6th ed. 1993).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 333, 335.
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appointed by the President and then confirmed by the Senate. Thus, in contrast
to the Speaker or President pro tempore, a Cabinet official can claim selection
by two continental institutions, and a mandate from the most truly national
institution (the Presidency). Moreover, only he can claim apostolic succession
from the very person whose presidential term ended prematurely.
This last idea-handpicked succession-is especially important. A modem
Vice President who moves up to the Oval Office derives his mandate largely
from the fact that he is the handpicked successor of the fallen President.108
Because the People on Election Day are not given a chance to cast separate
votes for the Vice President, he lacks apersonal electoral mandate. Instead, the
Vice President derives his mandate from the populist President who chose him
as both running mate and heir apparent.' 0 9 The Twenty-Fifth Amendment for-
malizes the notion of handpicked succession, empowering the President to
nominate her chosen heir, subject to congressional approval. 110 Cabinet suc-
cession simply extends this modem model of handpicked succession to the next
level of contingency: In the event of double death, the Oval Office will still
pass to a person handpicked by the President as her (contingent) successor. (If
none of the existing Cabinet offices is deemed appropriate for this ex officio
role as contingent successor, a new executive office of "First Secretary" could
be explicitly created with duties designed to provide the officer with suitable
training for the Presidency, and with a nomination and confirmation process
focusing directly on the express role of contingent successor.)"'
In general, this model of "apostolic" legitimacy will tend to preserve party
and policy continuity: The party that won the People's vote of confidence on
Election Day will continue to govern the White House. Legislative succession,
by contrast, can defy the People's presidential verdict, awarding the White
House to the party that decisively lost the Presidency on Election Day. 12 This
is an especially grave problem under current law, since statutory succession
does not trigger an interim election.' 3
As we have seen, congressional elections cannot substitute for presidential
ones. Even if they could, section 19 can defy the people's will on Congres-
sional Election Day. A Speaker who loses his district in an off-year November
election, and whose party goes down to defeat nationally, will still become
President-for more than two years!-if the Oval Office becomes vacant in
108. See SH.,VA, supra note 74, at 156-57.
109. Elsewhere, we have argued that perhaps the People should be allowed to vote separately on
the Vice Presidency, precisely to strengthen the mandate of a Vice President who may one day need to
lead the nation. See Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 946-47.
110. See note 90 supra and accompanying text. For more extended discussion of the notion of
legitimacy via handpicked succession, see Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death:
Closing the Constitution's Succession Gap, 48 Aiu. L. Rav. 215 (1995); see also Allan P. Sindler,
Presidential Selection and Succession in Special Situations, in PRFsmimAL SELECTnON 331, 351-54
(Alexander Heard & Michael Nelson eds., 1987).
111. For similar suggestions, see FEERICK, supra note 20, at 262 (describing New York Governor
Rockefeller's "First Secretary" proposal); SILVA, supra note 74, at 175-76 (advocating creation of the
office of Assistant President).
112. See SiLvA, supra note 74, at 154-55, 157.
113. For a discussion of interim elections, see text accompanying notes 121-125, 144 infra.
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mid-November, December, or early January. Thus, when fully considered, the
modem rise of political parties and a populist Presidency does not undercut, but
in fact buttresses, the case against legislative succession.
II. THE STATUTORY EVOLUTION
Given the powerful textual, historical, and structural arguments identified
above, how could Congress have ever enacted 3 U.S.C. section 19? To answer
this question, and to understand the evolution of the federal succession statute,
we must go back to the earliest version, enacted in 1792.114 One major faction
of the Second Congress wanted the Secretary of State to follow the Vice Presi-
dent in the succession order. 115 The Secretary of State at the time was Thomas
Jefferson. Another faction, however, consisted of Jefferson's political oppo-
nents: the Federalist party, headed by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton, who saw himself as the chief Cabinet officer.' 16 The Succession Act
of 1792 resolved this rivalry between Jefferson and Hamilton1 17 by identifying
the President pro tempore and then the Speaker as the first two in line after the
Vice President.' 1 8 In other words, Congress declared a pox on both executive
departments and (not surprisingly) favored its own. 19 Because political rival-
114. For general background on the political circumstances giving rise to the 1792 Act, see Brown
& Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 1418; Silva, supra note 13, at 458-60.
115. Silva, supra note 13, at 458-59.
116. See id. at 459-60 (contending that the first succession act, favoring legislative succession,
resulted "from Hamilton's antipathy for Jefferson, not from mature deliberation").
117. See 2 AtrNAi.s OF CONG. 1904 (Jan. 10, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Seney) ("He was not for
making any decision that would give umbrage to any officer of the Government. The Secretary of State
and the Secretary of the Treasury were equally entitled to the public notice.").
118. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886).
119. Two other (ultimately unsatisfactory) notions may have made it seem natural or appropriate
to place the President pro tempore next in line. First, the Senate, in some ways, resembles an executive
council, playing a role in advising on, as well as consenting to, executive appointments and treatymak-
ing. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Cf. WooD, supra note 13, at 138-39 (noting that in most colonial
governments, but not in early revolutionary state constitutions, the upper branch of the legislature also
served as the governor's council). But this vision of the Senate contradicts the strong separation of
executive and legislative personnel embodied in revolutionary state constitutions and in the Incompati-
bility Clause of the federal Constitution. See id. at 138 (noting criticism of early colonial councils which
mixed legislative and magisterial duties); see generally Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 9 (discussing the
Incompatibility Clause's role in maintaining separation of powers).
Second, some in Congress believed that since the Vice President-the er officio Senate Presi-
dent--succeeds a fallen President, the next official in line should be the Vice President's replacement as
Senate presider: the President pro tempore. Indeed, Roger Sherman (wrongly) thought that the Presi-
dent pro tempore, following Vice Presidential ascension, would himself become Vice President. See 2
Aa A.S oF CoNG. 1903 (Jan. 10, 1791), 1912 (Jan. 13, 1791). Sherman's textual mistake mirrors his
structural myopia: Unlike the Vice President, the President pro tempore formally represents but a single
state. His ascension to the Presidency would thus raise distinct issues of state favoritism and dis-
uniformity. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. And to remain in office, a Senator (unlike a Vice
President) might need to win state reelection in an off-year election. This would have made the Acting
President of the United States dependent on a single state legislature.
Once the decision was made to put the President pro tempore at the top of the Succession Act list,
notions of bicameralism may have argued for the Speaker's placement next in line. But see 3 ANNALS
OF CONG. 281 (Dec. 22, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Gerry) ("[H]e hoped that the House would never
consent to making their Speaker an amphibious animal."). Gerry did support the inclusion of the Presi-
dent pro tempore in the Succession Act. See id. at 302-03 (Jan. 2, 1792). Thus he appears to have
believed that the Senate was already "amphibious"--mixing executive and legislative functions (but not
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ries influenced the 1792 Act, and because Founding giants such as Madison
doubted the constitutionality of legislative succession, some twentieth century
Congressmen have rightly questioned the authoritativeness of the early Con-
gress' constitutional views.' 20
The 1792 Act does have one other noteworthy aspect: a provision for an
immediate national presidential election in the event the succession statute is
triggered. 12 1 The "Officer" who assumed the Presidency under the Act would
do so only for as long as was necessary to conduct a new election. This special
election procedure squares perfectly with the Constitution's Succession Clause,
which empowers Congress to specify an Acting President to serve "until... a
President shall be elected,"' 22 without explicitly insisting that the country wait
for a regular quadrennial election. Indeed, at the Philadelphia Convention,
James Madison took special pains to ensure that the Succession Clause was
worded to accommodate the possibility of an "intermediate election of the Pres-
ident." 23 And at the Virginia ratifying convention, he made public assurances
that in the event of double death, "the election of another President will imme-
diately take place."'124 As we urge in greater detail below, this "special elec-
tion" provision should be resurrected today. 125
In repealing the 1792 Act with the Act of 1886, Congress implemented a
succession scheme that excluded members of Congress, providing instead for
Cabinet succession.126 The 1886 Act also gave Congress discretion on whether
personnel) in its "Advice and Consent" concerning appointments and treatymaking-in ways the House
was not
120. For example, during the debates over the 1947 Act, Senator Hatch submitted a legal memo-
randum stating:
the original succession law was the offspring of a rivalry existing at the time between Mr.
Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Mr. Jefferson, then Secretary of State. It was the
"product of the personal and political animosities of that hour rather than one of deliberate
judgment of the Congress that passed it."
93 Coo. Rac. 7769 (1947). See also id. at 8629 (similar remarks of Rep. Gwynne). We should also
note that votes in the Second Congress over inclusion of legislators were close. On January 2, 1792, the
House defeated a motion to strike the President pro tempore by a vote of 27 to 24. The same day, the
House passed a motion to strike the Speaker by a vote of 26 to 25. Five days later, a motion to strike
both carried 32 to 22. Only after the Senate (acting behind closed doors) refused to yield the point did
the House give in by a vote of 31 to 24. FEmrcc, supra note 20, at 59-60. For a more general discus-
sion of the perils of overreliance on early Congresses' constructions of the Constitution, see Calabresi &
Prakash, supra note 43, at 551-59.
121. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 10, 1 Stat. 239, 240-41 (repealed 1886).
122. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
123. REcoRDs, supra note 16, at 535; see also id. at 599 & n.23, 626 (detailing variations in
Succession Clause language about "chusing" another President).
124. 3 THE DEBATEs IN THE SEvERAL STATE CoNvErMONs, ON Tim ADOPnON OF rm FEDEa.
CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONvENTION AT PmILADELPHIA, iN 1787, 487-88
(Jonathan Elliot ed.) (2d ed. Washington 1836).
125. Some doubt congressional power to call a special election. Hamlin, supra note 43, at 193-
94; Silva, supra note 13, at 469-75. But the Succession Clause explicitly empowers Congress to "by
Law provide for the Case of" double vacancy in the White House. U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. The
power to call a special election by law seems implicit here and clearly intended. Above and beyond the
clear words and implication of this clause, the letter and spirit of the so-called "Sweeping Clause" give
Congress power to pass "all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution...
Powers vested by [the] Constitution... in any Department or Officer." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18
(emphasis added).
126. Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, § 1, 24 Stat. 1, 1 (repealed 1947).
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to call a special presidential election. 127 The legislative debates of the 1886
Act, both in the House and the Senate, reflected: (1) widespread doubt as to the
constitutionality of the 1792 Act, based in large part on the scope of the term
"Officer"; (2) disenchantment with the conflict-of-interest shenanigans during
Andrew Johnson's 1868 impeachment; and (3) concern that legislative succes-
sion could deliver the Oval Office keys to the party locked out of the White
House by the People on Presidential Election Day.128
In 1947, Congress again revised the succession order by enacting section
19, which reinstates legislators atop the list, but this time with the President pro
tempore following the Speaker. 129 Several members of Congress argued
against the constitutionality of the 1947 law during the legislative debates, but
the bill's supporters relied on an opinion by Acting Attorney General Douglas
McGregor, who concluded that congressmen were "Officers" within the mean-
ing of the Succession Clause.' 30 McGregor's reasoning is-not to mince
words-shoddy.' 31 Importantly, the 1947 version, which still governs today,
127. Id. See also Hamlin, supra note 43, at 191-94 (discussing special election under the Act); cf
Silva, supra note 13, at 472-73 (noting objections to reading a special election provision into the 1886
Act but ultimately concluding that such a provision was intended).
128. See 93 CONo. Rac. 7769 (1947) (reproducing a report by Sen. Hatch which details objections
during debate over the 1886 Act to deeming the Speaker and President pro tempore "Officers" for
succession purposes); FEEaucx, supra note 20, at 144-45; FaERucK, supra note 65, at 41. For more
discussion, see Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 1420-21; Silva, supra note 13, at 451-52, 461-
63; Sindler, supra note 110, at 346.
129. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1), (b) (1994). The belief that legislative leaders, unlike Cabinet members
(or federal judges), enjoyed an "electoral mandate" spurred President Truman to ask Congress to rein-
state the President pro tempore and Speaker atop the succession list. FMaIUCK, supra note 20, at 205-06;
Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 1421-30 & n.1 11; Sindler, supra note 110, at 353; Silva, supra
note 13, at 454-55. But see text accompanying notes 102-113 supra (arguing that Cabinet members
possess a greater national electoral mandate than legislators).
130. 93 CONG. REc. 8621-22 (1947) (reprinting Letter from Acting Attorney General Douglas v.
McGregor to Hon. Earl C. Michener, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary).
131. McGregor leaned heavily on the early Congress' interpretation of the Succession Clause, as
reflected in the Act of 1792. Such strong reliance on early congressional interpretations, infected by
political self-dealing, is misplaced. See note 120 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, the 1792 and
the 1947 Acts differed in key ways. The 1947 Act explicitly required an ascending legislator to resign
his legislative leadership, but the 1792 Act maintained a pointed silence on this. Several lav'makers who
voted for the 1792 Act apparently thought that resignation was not required. This judgment is obviously
unconstitutional, see text accompanying notes 34-35 supra, and thus provides little comfort to support-
ers of the 1947 Act. Other early legislators may have believed that the Constitution did indeed require
resignation, but they failed to come to grips with the unique practical and constitutional problems cre-
ated by resignation. See notes 30-49 supra and accompanying text. In short, by faling to explicitly
address the resignation dilemma that Madison posed, see note 143 infra, the Second Congress simply
evaded the key analytic issue, and thus the Act is entitled to little weight as a considered constitutional
judgment. (And, of course, no statutory succession ever took place under the 1792 Act--or has yet to
take place under the 1947 Act-and so the practical slate remains relatively clean.)
McGregor also stressed the breadth of the word "Officer" in the Succession Clause, but he failed to
address the textual and structural criticisms of that construction raised in this article. Finally, McGregor
waved in the direction ofLamar v. United States, in which the Court decided that an imposter Congress-
man had falsely portrayed himself as an "officer acting under the authority of the United States" within
the meaning of a 1909 fraud statute. Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 112-15 (1916). But the
Justices in Lamar took great pains to stress that a term can have one meaning in a statute and another in
the Constitution. See id. at 112; Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916) (same case) ("As to the
construction of the Constitution being involved, it obviously is not .... [O]f course words may be used
in a statute in a different sense from that in which they are used in the Constitution."). Correct interpre-
tation requires careful examination of the Constitution itself, and this McGregor failed to offer.
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omitted-over President Truman's objection-any provision for an immediate
election should the succession act be triggered. 132
Other provisions of section 19 of the 1947 Act have created additional con-
stitutional and practical problems. First, section 19 provides that a Cabinet
officer who assumes the Presidency after the Speaker and President pro
tempore have passed up their chance can later be "bumped" out of the Oval
Office if either legislator changes his mind or is replaced by a new legislative
leader. 133 Bumping creates huge problems of logistics and fosters gamesman-
ship.' 3 4 It also seems to violate the plain meaning of the Constitution.135
Under the Succession Clause, Congress may declare what Officer shall succeed
and such officer shall "then act as President ... until the [presidential or vice
presidential] Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.' 3 6 By
what logic, or authority, can Congress instead declare that an Officer shall act
as President until some other suitor wants the Job? Neither the Act of 1792 nor
the Act of 1886 provided for bumping; on the contrary, the author of the 1886
Act, Senator Hoar, proclaimed bumping unconstitutional. 137 To make matters
even fishier, only congressional leaders can bump under section 19; a higher
ranking Cabinet officer cannot bump a lower ranking officer once the latter has
assumed the office of Acting President. This selective bumping smacks of leg-
islative self-dealing.
Second, the 1947 Act requires any Cabinet officer who ascends to resign
his Cabinet post in order to act as President.' 38 Consider the case where the
Vice Presidency is vacant and the President becomes temporarily disabled-
say, an operation will put her out of action for an anticipated two weeks.
Neither the Speaker nor the President pro tempore is likely to resign his legisla-
tive seat to act as President for a mere two weeks-and, as we have seen, the
Incompatibility Clause demands this resignation. 139 The ball, therefore, now
bounces into the Secretary of State's court. Section 19 forces him to give up
his State Department post in order to act as President; and once the disabled
132. See FEmucC, supra note 20, at 205-08; Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 1421-22 &
n. 111; Silva, supra note 13, at 456; Sindler, supra note 110, at 335.
133. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2) (1994).
134. FEEICK, supra note 20, at 268-69 (noting that bumping could result in several Presidencies
within a short period and that Cabinet officers serving as Acting President would be "straitjacketed");
Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 1437-40, 1448-50 (hypothesizing the political jockeying by
Speaker Tip O'Neill, President pro tempore Strom Thurmond, and Secretary of State George Schultz
that could have occurred in the wake of the assassination attempt on President Reagan and arguing for
reform of § 19's bumping provision).
135. See FEmucRK, supra note 20, at 268-69; SiLvA, supra note 74, at 175.
136. U.S. CorsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (emphasis added).
137. 17 CoNG. Rac. 220 (1885) ("You never go back up the ladder after you have gone down
around."); 14 CoNG. REc. 880 (1883) (recording Hoar's belief that Congress may appoint a successor
President until disability ceases or a new election occurs, but not until another officer qualifies); see also
Silva, supra note 13, at 469 & n.68 (citing Hoar's remarks during congressional debates between 1883
and 1886).
138. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(3) (1994).
139. See text accompanying notes 30-38 supra. Section 19 also explicitly requires that an ascend-
ing Speaker must resign both his legislative seat and his Speakership. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (1994). Simi-
larly, an ascending President pro tempore must likewise resign from the Senate and from his Senate
office. Id. at § 19(b).
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President recovers and resumes the reins, the Secretary will regain his post only
by rerunning the nomination and confirmation gauntlet. This hardly seems a
fitting reward for a good and faithful public servant. The Act of 1886 did not
require Cabinet resignation; on the contrary, as discussed earlier, many of its
backers believed that a Cabinet officer must keep his post to act as President. 140
In short, legislative debates over the centuries do little to refute the force of
our analysis in this article. Once, in 1886, Congress denied itself; and twice, in
1792 and 1947, Congress favored its own. Constitutionally, Congress' self-de-
nial was a far, far better thing than its self-dealing.
III. THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION
In the end, the question is not just whose reading of the Succession Clause
is best. We must bear in mind the factual contexts in which succession be-
comes an issue. Statutory succession provisions are triggered by events that
rock the very foundations of the country's political and social stability. Consti-
tutional faiths, too, are at stake during these periods of crisis. The need for a
smooth, orderly, lawful, ethical, and uncontroversial transition of power is at its
peak. Precisely because our nation needs to instill confidence in the constitu-
tional rule of law, we establish succession schemes before the need to use them
should arise.141 We should devise and construe these schemes to minimize the
self-dealing opportunities and logistical glitches that will threaten any succes-
sor President's legitimacy at home and abroad. In implementing the Succes-
sion Clause, we should steer wide of any sizeable constitutional or ethical
challenges. Even a little uncertainty about the legitimacy or constitutionality of
a presidential successor makes an already sad situation unacceptably worse. 142
Thus, if our constitutional criticisms of section 19 merely inspire serious
doubt about the current succession scheme, those criticisms become winners
because of the stakes involved. In fact, as we have seen, these criticisms are
more than substantial. The most straightforward reading of the Constitution's
text, the clear implication of five related yet distinct structural themes, and the
spirit of twentieth century developments all point to the same conclusion: Leg-
islators are not "Officers" under the Succession Clause. 143 And if this is so,
140. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
141. Amar, supra note 110, at 215, 221-22, 227.
142. Consider, for example, the uncertainty of succession revealed by a careful reading of Secre-
tary of State Haig's 1981 comments. See note 83 supra.
143. Some of the most important constitutional arguments against legislative succession were
flagged by James Madison in his letter to Edmund Pendleton lamenting the "err[or]" Congress made in
enacting the Succession Act of 1792 placing the President pro tempore and Speaker on the list:
1. It may be questioned whether these are officers, in the constitutional sense. 2. If officers
whether both could be introduced. 3. As they are created by the Constitution, they would
probably have been there designated if contemplated for such a service, instead of being left to
Legislative selection. 4. Either they will retain their legislative stations, and their incompatible
functions will be blended; or the incompatibility will supersede those stations, [and] then those
being the substratum of the adventitious functions, these must fail also. The Constitution says,
Cong[ress] may declare what officers [etc.,] which seems to make it not an appointment or a
translation; but an annexation of one office or trust to another office. The House of
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Congress should act now rather than risk a national crisis when tragedy sud-
denly strikes.
We also believe that a sensible modem day succession statute should pro-
vide for a prompt national election should events trigger statutory succession.
On this point, we recommend reenactment of some form of the 1792 Act's
Rep[resentatives] proposed to substitute the Secretary of State, but the Senate disagreed, [and]
there being much delicacy in the matter it was not pressed by the former.
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 20, at 235-36. With remarkable grace and
pith, Madison thus set the stage for much of our analysis today.
To the extent that Professor Manning disagrees with us (and with Madison) we are unpersuaded.
The Constitution must mean something-the best reading of the document either permits or bars legisla-
tive succession. Manning tries to raise doubts about our reading, but fails to weave together a coherent
set of arguments that a contrary reading is equally or more plausible overall. Some of his objections just
don't wash. For example, he criticizes our reading of the term "officer" as the least natural textually,.but
fails to see that the most "natural" textual reading is one that accounts for a provision's place in the
larger constitutional structure. (This error, and others, would have been more evident had he in fact tried
to make the affumative case for legislative succession.)
Manning's key suggestion is that an Acting President is not, as such, an "Officer of the United
States." See John F. Manning, Not Proved: Some Lingering Questions About Legislative Succession to
the Presidency, 48 STAN. L. R.v. 141, 143, 145 (1995). This is a novel claim-which itself should
worry a self-described traditionalist-and an odd one. If an acting President, wielding the full and
awesome executive power of the United States, is not an "Officer of the United States," what is he? And
if he does not "hold[ ] an[ ] Office under the United States," U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 6, cI. 2 (Incompatibil-
ity Clause), it's hard to see why he must (or even can) take the Presidential oath of office, id. art II, § I,
cl. 8 (Presidential Oath Clause), or how he could be "removed from Office" via the impeachment
process, id. art II, § 4 (Impeachment Clause).
To avoid the terrifying Scylla of an utterly unaccountable President-a nonofficer officer-Man-
ning lurches toward Charybdis. On his account, a Speaker remains Acting President only by retaining
his Speakership and thus the support of a House majority. Manning, supra, at 146 n.29. But this simply
creates a Parliamentary Prime Minister eligible to preside simultaneously at both ends of Pennsylvania
Avenue, and removable at will by a mere majority of the House. Indeed, to stay in the Oval Office, the
Speaker must win reelection in his district in an off-year election. All this makes sense in a Parliamen-
tary system, but the idea that the Nation's President should be dependent on the will of a single district is
anathema to our Constitution. These huge structural anomalies are not de minimis when they happen,
and Manning's approach makes them more likely to happen ex ante. The warped incentives created by
legislative succession can cause double vacancies by encouraging groundless impeachments and unrea-
sonable delays in filling vice-presidential vacancies. Manning's exigency is not exogenous. (And spe-
cial elections cannot cure this, since they are not required by the Constitution, or even by the 1947 Act.)
To support this radical Prime Ministerialization of America, Manning points to the Vice Presi-
dency. Manning, supra, at 148-50. But the plain language of the Constitution prevents a Vice Presi-
dent/Acting President from blending executive and legislative leadership by simultaneously presiding at
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. See note 48 supra; text accompanying notes 32 & 56 supra. And
unlike Manning's Speaker, the Vice President/Acting President cannot be ousted merely because a bare
House majority decides at any point that they don't like him, instead, he is removable only if impeached
and convicted of "high crimes and misdemeanors." Manning also ignores other key differences between
Vice President and Senators. See note 119 supra. Thus, he is left in the awkward position of(properly)
admitting that a Virginia governor may not act as President, but (oddly) suggesting that a Virginia
Senator may so act, even though the Senator may have to win reelection in Virginia to remain in the
Oval Office.
Manning also leans heavily on the self-dealing Act of 1792, but early Acts cannot repeal clear
constitutional principles. (Otherwise, the infamous Sedition Act of 1798 repealed the First Amend-
ment.) Here, the structural arguments were not, on balance, close in 1792. And we reject Manning's
muffled claim that an amendment passed in the 1960s somehow retroactively changed the fact that
Congress "clearly erred" (Madison's phrase) in 1792. (Manning also blurs real differences between
legislators and Cabinet members under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. See note 101 supra.)
For additional arguments casting doubt on Manning's approach, but approximating his conclusion
that Congress should repeal the 1947 Act on constitutional grounds, while courts should stay out, see
Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. Ray. 155 (1995).
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special election device. If, God forbid, a bomb were to go off at the inaugural
celebration, the People of the United States should not be stuck for four years
with a President they did not elect-a President who, indeed, may represent a
party they decisively rejected on Election Day.144 Provision for a special elec-
tion should be fixed in advance in a succession statute, rather than left to con-
gressional discretion after statutory succession has occurred. On this single
point, the Act of 1792 was far better than the Act of 1886, which effectively
gave Congress discretion to determine the term of a successor President. Such
discretion is very much in keeping with a British Parliamentary model, but
not with the structural separation of powers established by the American
Constitution. 145
144. Under our proposal, the interim President elected in a special election would merely serve
out the remainder of the regular term; the regular rhythm of quadrennial Leap Year elections would
remain undisturbed. Some have argued that because a President must serve a four-year term under the
language of Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 ("[the President] shall hold his Office during the Term of four
Years"), a specially elected President must be elected for a new four year term. E.g., FEaauc, supra
note 20, at 146 (noting that it was assumed during debates over the 1886 Act that special election would
result in a four-year term for the new successor President-elect); Silva, supra note 13, at 474-75 (stating
that most scholars conclude that a special election must result in a new four-year term). Such arguments
misread the Term Clause by applying it beyond its intended scope. The clause specifies the standard
term of an ordinarily elected President, but it does not apply to specially elected Presidents. Precisely
because, contrary to the Term Clause, a prior President did not "hold his Office during the Term of four
years," Congress may call a special election to complete the prior President's term, rather than to begin
a new one. Similarly, a Vice President who, after the death of a President, himself "become[s] Presi-
dent" under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not begin his own new four-year term but merely com-
pletes his predecessor's term. And a person who becomes Vice President under Section 2 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment likewise serves out the remainder of her predecessor's term rather than a new
four-year term. This reading preserves the permanent synchronization of presidential and congressional
elections, an important part of the constitutional system in place over the last two centuries.
The precise timing of the special election poses the following dilemma: we must allow enough
time for grieving, campaigning, and choosing, but the more time allowed for all this, the less time left in
the original four-year term. See FasiucK supra note 65, at 222. Assuming that a proper special election
could be conducted within six or seven months of statutory succession, such an extra election would
make sense only if succession occurred within the first two-and-a-half years of a regular presidential
term.
Some have argued that, since a proper presidential election requires a simultaneous vice-presiden-
tial election, Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment effectively repealed the Founders' special elec-
tion option: A statutory successor President, the argument runs, can nominate a new Vice President,
who, once confirmed, cannot be ousted from office until the next quadrennial election. FEEaucK, supra
note 65, at 226. This argument invites three big criticisms. First, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment sharply
distinguishes between the powers of a true "President" and those of an "Acting President." See U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XXV, § 3. Only a "President" can nominate under Section 2. And, strictly speaking, a
statutory successor is not a true President, but only an "Officer ... act[ing] as President" under the
Succession Clause-an "Acting President" within the meaning of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Con-
tra Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 1405 n.60, 1441-44 (arguing that an Acting President has
discretion to nominate a new Vice President). Second, even if a statutory Acting President can invoke
Section 2, it is hard to see how he could do more than nominate an Acting Vice President whose tenure
would track his own. Since his own tenure is clearly limited by the special election option, so too with
the tenure of his Acting Vice President. (This preserves Article It's requirement that a President and his
Vice President serve the "same Term.' U.S. CoNsT., art. II, § 1, cl. I (emphasis added).) Third, a
special presidential election need not mirror a regular quadrennial election in every respect. Just as a
special election may be for a short "residue" term, perhaps it may also depart from tradition and be a
"President-only" election if the Vice Presidency were somehow deemed "filled" under Section 2.
145. See Hamlin, supra note 43, at 192-93.
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If, as we strongly urge, Congress ever revisits presidential succession, two
additional items cry out for legislative solution. First, Congress should provide
for various scenarios of prepresidential death or disability. What if a leading
candidate dies or becomes disabled right before Election Day? Or if the Elec-
tion Day winner, the de facto President elect, dies or becomes disabled before
the electoral college meets? Or if the electoral college winner dies or becomes
disabled before the electoral votes are counted in Congress? A sensible legisla-
tive solution would postpone elections in the event of a candidate's death
before Election Day, but would treat the Election Day winner as de facto Presi-
dent elect, whose death should trigger the same apostolic succession rules ap-
plicable in postInauguration scenarios. 146
Second, Congress needs to create a statutory mechanism for determining
and responding to disability in the White House under conditions where Sec-
tion 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is unavailing. Section 4 currently piv-
ots on the Vice President's power to certify the President's disability. But what
if the Vice Presidency is temporarily vacant and an issue of presidential disabil-
ity arises? Or if the Vice President assumes the reins as Acting President, and
then her own disability comes into question? Or if the President is (for now)
healthy and in control, but an issue of vice presidential disability arises? A
sensible statute would address these problems by giving the next person in the
succession line-in our model, a Cabinet official like the Secretary of State-
the same kind of triggering role that Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
gives the Vice President.
In light of our textual, structural, political, practical, and ethical concerns
about section 19, we suggest that Speaker Gingrich might do well to consider
adding one more item to his already crowded reform agenda: amendment of
the problematic statute that might one day make him President, but might not
make him legitimate or even constitutional.147
146. For elaboration of the details of such a legislative solution, see Amar, supra note 110, at 222-
38.
147. For the record, we voiced similar concerns well before Newt Gingrich ever became Speaker.
See Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 914 & n.4, 943-44, 946-47 (criticizing schemes that might award
the Presidency to someone who lacks a national electoral mandate); Amar, supra note 110, at 237 n.30
(reflecting ideas presented in a symposium held in April 1994 and in testimony given before the U.S.
Senate in February 1994).
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